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State v. Perank:' Is the Uintah-Ouray 
Reservation "Nailed Down Upon the   order"?^ 
Part of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation in northeastern 
Utah was opened for non-Indian settlement in 1905. In 1985 
the Tenth Circuit ruled that the boundaries of this reservation 
were not changed by the acts which made tribal lands available 
for sale to non-Indian  settler^.^ In contrast, in 1992 the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the reservation boundaries had been 
diminished by these acts and that a state trial court had crimi- 
nal jurisdiction over a crime committed by an Indian on non- 
Indian land within the original boundaries of the r e se~a t ion .~  
This note examines the Utah Supreme Court decision in 
State u. Perank. Part I1 provides a brief historical background 
of the federal government's policy regarding allotment of tribal 
lands and also summarizes the Tenth Circuit's 1985 decision. 
1. Editor's note: On November 25, 1992, the Utah Supreme Court ordered that 
an "issuance of remittitur [in State v. Perank], be stayed pending (1) the conclusion 
of any proceedings on certiorari in the United States Supreme Court in [State v. 
Perank] or State v. Hagen, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 ([I July 17, 1992), and (2) the 
final disposition of the injunction proceeding pending in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Ute Indian Tribe u. State of Utah, et al., Civil No. 
C75-408." As of the date of publication, Perank has not been published in the 
official reporter. Although the opinion is subject to revision prior to final 
publication, the Editors have determined to publish this note because the question 
of whether the Uintah-Ouray Reservation was diminished is timely and because 
the general analysis regarding diminishment of reservations is pertinent and 
meaninghl. 
2. In 1903, Bureau of Indian Affairs Inspector James McLaughlin solicited the 
consent of the Ute Indians to allotment of tribal lands. He explained to the 
Indians: 
You say that line is very heavy and that the reservation is nailed down 
upon the border. That is very true as applying to the past many years 
and up to now, but Congress has provided legislation which will pull up  
the nails which hold down that line and after next year there will be no 
outside boundary line to this reservation. 
Minutes of Councils Held by James McLaughlin, U.S. Indian Inspector, with the 
Utah and White River Ute Indians a t  Uintah Agency, Utah 42 (May 18-23, 1903), 
quoted in State v. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 12 (July 17, 1992). 
3. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). 
4. State v. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 18 (July 17, 1992). 
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Part I11 gives a synopsis of Perank's facts and examines the 
court's reasoning. Part IV analyzes the decision by using the 
analytical structure set forth by the Supreme Court in Solem u. 
~ a r t l e t t ~  and by focusing on the differences between Perank 
and the Tenth Circuit decision. This note concludes that the 
Perank decision was correct because the express language of 
the statutes which opened the Uintah Reservation for non- 
Indian settlement demonstrates congressional intent to dimin- 
ish the reservation boundaries and because the disputed lands 
have lost their Indian character. 
A. The Allotment Policy 
Federal Indian policy shifted significantly in the latter part 
of the nineteenth centuqc6 In 1887 the federal government 
turned away from its prior policy of communally owned tribal 
reservations and adopted a policy of allotting separate parcels 
of tribally held lands to individual members. The concept un- 
derlying this policy was "to lure the nomadic tribes away from 
their communal village existence and to encourage a sedentary, 
rural agricultural life on separate allotments."' Congress 
passed several pieces of legislation in support of this policy 
which opened specific reservations for allotment and made the 
surplus lands available to non-Indian settlers.' 
The failure of Congress to dictate precise boundary chang- 
5. 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
6. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 147-52 (3d ed. 
1991). 
7. Id. a t  148. The General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act) authorized the 
President to allot parcels of reservation lands to Indians and to sell the unallotted 
lands to non-Indians. 25 U.S.C. 8 331 (1988). "In view of the discretionary nature 
of this presidential power, Congress occasionally enacted special legislation in order 
to assure that a particular reservation was in fact opened to allotment." Mattz v. 
Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 497 (1973). The openings of specific reservations for allot- 
ment were governed by 108' separate pieces of legislation. 
Some of the acts provided for the outright cession of the unallotted lands; 
some provided for a cession in trust; some provided that the unallotted 
lands would be "restored to the public domain" or to status as "public 
lands;" other acts simply provided that the unallotted lands would be 
opened for settlement . . . . 
Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1152 (D. Utah 1981) (citations omit- 
ted). 
8. See, e-g., Act,of May 30, 1910, ch. 260, 36 Stat. 448; Act of May 29, 1908, 
ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1035. 
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es as it opened the various reservations has created a modern 
jurisdictional q~andary.~ State courts have limited criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country.1° If a crime is committed by or 
against an Indian in Indian country, jurisdiction is federal or 
tribal." The only time that a state clearly has jurisdiction 
over a crime committed in Indian country is when both the 
defendant and the victim are non-Indians? Thus, knowing 
the boundaries of Indian country is essential to resolving any 
criminal jurisdictional issue. 
Since 1948, "Indian country" has been defined by statute 
as "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under 
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwith- 
standing the issuance of any patent."13 Whether land consti- 
tutes Indian country under this definition turns on whether it 
is located within the boundaries of an Indian reservation. 
Moreover, once established, a reservation remains Indian coun- 
try until it is terminated by Congress; the mere sale of reserva- 
tion land to non-Indians does not remove the land from the 
reservation for jurisdictional purposes.14 As a result, modern 
9. Congress did not focus on the precise boundaries of the reservations which 
were opened for allotment because it was commonly assumed that all reservations 
would be abolished as the culmination of the allotment policy. See Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 624-25 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). During the 
time the allotment policy was being implemented, Indian country as a jurisdictional 
concept was defined as including only lands held under Indian title. See, eg., Bates 
v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 208 (1877). This title-dependent definition was later expand- 
ed to include all lands within the boundaries of an Indian reservation regardless of 
title. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984). 
10. Congress has granted certain states, including Kansas, North Dakota and 
Iowa, concurrent criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations. See Negonsott v. 
Samuels, 61 U.S.L.W. 4185, 4186 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1993). 
11. 18 U.S.C. $8 1152-1153 (1988). 
12. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881); see generally FELIX 
S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 34-38, 286-304, 335-41 (Rennard 
Strickland et al. eds., 1982); Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian 
Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARE. L. REV. 503 (1976). 
13. 18 U.S.C. $ 1151(a) (1988). A patent is the instrument by which the federal 
government grants public lands to an individual. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1125 
(6th ed. 1990). The statute also defines Indian country as "all dependent Indian 
communities within the borders of the United States . . . , and . . . all Indian al- 
lotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of- 
way running through the same." 18 U.S.C. 5 1151(b)-(c) (1988). 
14. Clinton, supra note 12, a t  513. The question has frequently arisen whether 
an act of Congress which opened reservation land for sale to non-Indians has di- 
minished the boundaries of a reservation, thereby removing the land from Indian 
country for jurisdictional purposes. See, eg., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U S .  584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County 
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Su- 
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criminal jurisdictional questions are resolved by determining 
whether Congress intended to reduce or diminish a reser- 
vation's boundaries by passing a particular act, even though a t  
the time the distinction seemed unimportant.15 Thus, the 
terms of the statutes which opened the particular reservation 
for settlement must be examined to determine whether Con- 
gress intended to diminish the reservation boundaries. 
B. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah1' 
In 1975 the Ute Indian Tribe enacted and published a Law 
and Order Code which purported to exercise jurisdiction over 
all lands within the Uintah and Uncompahgre Reservations as 
they were originally created." Several municipalities and one 
county located within the original Uintah Reservation and the 
State of Utah protested, and the Ute Tribe sued for declaratory 
and injunctive relief to determine the present extent of tribal 
jurisdicti~n. '~ The district court ruled that the boundaries of 
the Uncompahgre Reservation had been disestablished by Con- 
gress but that the boundaries of the Uintah Reservation, now 
called the Uintah-Ouray Reservation, had not been diminished 
by the acts of Congress which allotted tribal lands to tribal 
members and opened the unallotted lands for non-Indian set- 
tlement. '' 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit &rmed the district court's 
decision in part, but reversed the district court's holding that 
the Uncompahgre Reservation was dise~tablished.~~ The court 
perintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
15. Solem, 465 U.S. at 468. 
16. 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). 
17. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-77 (D. Utah 1981), affd 
in part & rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 994 (1986). 
18. Id. at 1078-79. 
19. The district court also held that the original boundaries of the Uintah Res- 
ervation were diminished by withdrawal of an area known as the Gilsonite Strip, 
withdrawal of 1,010,000 acres for an addition to the adjacent national forest re- 
serve, and withdrawal of 56,000 acres for a reclamation project. The court found 
that the boundaries of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation were extended in 1948 to 
include 510,000 acres known as the Hill Creek Extension. Id. at  1153-54. 
20. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at  1093. The Tenth Circuit also reversed the 
district court's holding that the Uintah reservation was diminished by the with- 
drawal of 1,010,000 acres of forest land. Id. A previous panel decision of the Tenth 
Circuit held that the unallotted lands became part of the public domain and were 
not, therefore, within the boundaries of the reservation. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 
716 F.2d 1298, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983). 
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noted that disestablishment or diminishment of the reservation 
would require a "clear expression of congressional intent to  
change the status of the re~ervation."~' The court found that 
only two situations would reveal such an intent: (1) when the 
act opening the reservation makes explicit reference to cession, 
coupled with an unconditional commitment to compensate the 
tribe .for lost lands; or (2) when events surrounding passage of 
the act " 'reveal a widely held, contemporaneous understanding 
that the affected reservation would shrink as a result of the 
proposed legislation.' "22 
Reviewing the legislation which opened the Uintah Reser- 
vation, the court found that neither the language nor the sur- 
rounding circumstances were sufficiently clear to support a 
finding of congressional intent to diminish the boundaries of 
the Uintah Reservation. "[Iln the absence of 'substantial and 
compelling evidence of a congressional intention to diminish 
Indian lands,' the courts' 'traditional solicitude for the Indian 
tribes' must compel a finding that 'the old reservation bound- 
aries survived the opening.' 'a3 
The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the language of the stat- 
ute that opened the neighboring Uncompahgre Reservation and 
concluded that "the phrase 'restore to the public domain' [was] 
not the same as a congressional state of mind to disestablish" 
and that the "expression 'return to the public domain' [did] not 
reliably establish the clear and unequivocal evidence of 
Congress' intent to change b~undaries."~~ The court reasoned 
that the statutory phrase contained no explicit language of 
termination nor did it include an unconditional commitment to 
compensate the Indians for their lands.25 
Despite the Tenth Circuit decision in Ute Indian Tribe v. 
Utah, the Utah Supreme Court recently held in State v. 
21. IJte Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d a t  1088. 
22. Id. (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984)). 
23. Id. at 1089 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at  472). 
24. Id. at 1092. (citation omitted). 
25. Id. The status of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation lands at  the end of the 
federal litigation was as follows: (1) the boundaries of the Uncompahgre Reserva- 
tion remained as they had been established in 1882; (2) the original boundaries of 
the Uintah Reservation were diminished by withdrawal of a 7,040 acre tract known 
as the Gilsonite Strip and withdrawal of 56,000 acres for the Strawberry River 
reclamation project; and (3) the reservation included all of the lands allotted to the 
Indians and the lands reserved for tribal use under the 1905 Act, the surplus or 
unallotted lands which were opened to non-Indian settlement and the lands set 
aside for the forest reserve. Id. at  1089. 
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PerankZ6 that the phrase "restore t o  the public domain" as ap- 
plied to  the Uintah Reservation did express congressional in- 
tent to diminish the boundaries. 
111. State v. Perank 
During a probation revocation proceeding in a state trial 
court, Clinton Perark, who had pleaded guilty to burglary, 
asserted that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
because he was an Indian and the offense had occurred in Indi- 
an country.27 The trial court rejected Perank's arguments, re- 
voked his probation, and ordered that he serve a term in the 
state prison.28 On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court's order after determining that Myton, Utah, the 
site at which the burglary occurred, lies outside the boundaries 
of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation and, consequently, was not 
within Indian country.29 In reaching this conclusion, the Utah 
Supreme Court reasoned that a 1902 congressional act-as 
amended by subsequent acts in 1903, 1904 and 1905-restored 
the unallotted, unreserved lands of the Uintah Reservation to 
the public domain30 and "that the Reservation boundaries 
were diminished by that re~toration."~~ Accordingly, the state 
trial court had jurisdiction over the offense.32 
26. 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (July 17, 1992). 
27. Id. at 5. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at  18. The court first addressed Perank's Indian status even though the 
- state conceded that Perank was an Indian. The court determined that ~ e r a i k  had 
a significant amount of Indian blood and that he had been recognized as an Indian 
by both the tribe and the federal government. He was, therefore, an Indian for the 
purpose of determining jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. $9 1152-1153. Id. at  6. 
30. The Perank Court' noted that the legal status of the "trust lands" of the 
Uintah Reservation (lands allotted to Indians or reserved for tribal use), the land 
which was withdrawn from the Reservation and attached to the adjoining national 
forest reserve, the Uncompahgre Reservation, and the land known as the Hill 
Creek Extension was not a t  issue in this case. "The only issue in this case . . . is 
whether the unallotted and unreserved lands that were opened to entry in 1905 
and not later restored to tribal ownership and jurisdiction by the 1945 'Order of 
Restoration' are within the present boundaries of the Reservation." Id. at  7. 
31. Id. at 18. Justice Zimmerman vigorously dissented from the majority opin- 
ion, arguing that the Utah Supreme Court should defer to the decision of the 
Tenth Circuit under the doctrine of comity. Id. at 22-25 (Zimmerman, J., dissent- 
ing). 
32. Id. at  18. 
12471 UINTA. RESERVATION JURISDICTION 
A. The Statutory Scheme 
A basic understanding of the statutes that led to the open- 
ing of the Uintah Reservation is essential to comprehend the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision. In 1902 Congress passed an 
act which provided a scheme for opening the Uintah Reserva- 
tion for non-Indian ~et t lement .~~ This Act set October 1, 1903 
as the date for allotting lands to tribal members and restoring 
surplus lands to the public domain.34 It required Indian con- 
sent to the allotment scheme and provided that lands opened 
for settlement would be sold for $1.25 an acre, with the pro- 
ceeds used for reimbursing the United States and for the bene- 
fit of the Ute Tribe.35 
After learning that "the surveying necessary to make the 
allotments to the Indians could not be completed and Indian 
consent would not be forthcoming," Congress passed another 
act that dealt with opening the re~ervation.~~ The 1903 Act 
amended the 1902 Act by dispensing with the requirement of 
Indian consent and changing the opening date to October 1, 
1904 .~~  On April 21, 1904, Congress amended the 1902 and 
1903 Acts to provide for additional time t o  make the allotments 
and to open the surplus lands for entry.38 
Congress enacted the March 3, 1905 Act in response to a 
report that additional time was needed to complete the allot- 
ment process.3g The 1905 Act set September 1, 1905 as the 
new date for opening the reservation unless the President de- 
termined that it could be opened earlier; the Act also allowed 
the President to set aside lands for the Uintah Forest Reserve 
and for the protection of the Indians' water supply.40 
After reviewing these statutes, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that "Congress intended only to amend specific 
33. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245. 
34. Id. at 263. 
35. Id. at 263-64. 
36. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11. 
37. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stai. 982, 997-98. The provision of the 
Act which deleted the requirement of Indian consent "was apparently based on the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Lone Wolf u. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 
(1903), decided January 5 ,  1903, which held that Congress could unilaterally dimin- 
ish a reservation." Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11. 
38. Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 207-08. 
39. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1069-70. 
40.  Id. 
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aspects of the 1902, 1903, and 1904 Acts and. . . [elxcept as 
specifically amended, Congress did not intend t o  change the 
basic features of the 1902 and 1903  act^."^' The court stated: 
After enactment of the 1905 Act, the 1902 Act remained in 
full force and effect with respect to (1) providing for allot- 
ments to heads of households and members of the Uintah and 
White River Tribes and for the amount of acreage for each 
allotment; (2) restoring the unallotted lands to the public 
domain; (3)  fixing the price to be paid per acre by homestead- 
ers; (4) providing how and to whose benefit the proceeds de- 
rived from the sale of the unallotted lands were to be applied; 
and (5) protecting certain mineral  right^.'^ 
Thus, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the 1902 Act 
was the basic statutory authority for opening the Uintah Res- 
ervation. The essential elements of the 1902 Act, including the 
operative language restoring unallotted lands to the public 
domain, remained in effect through the enactment of the 1905 
ActF3 
B. The Effect of the Phrase "Restore to the Public Domain" 
After determining that the 1902 Act was the basic statuto- 
ry authority for opening the reservation, the Perank court re- 
41. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. a t  13. 
42. Id. (emphasis added). 
43. Id. Part of the controversy between the Tenth Circuit and Utah decisions is 
the determination of which act actually opened the reservation. The Tenth Circuit, 
in Ute Indian Tribe, held that the terms of the Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 
Stat. 1048, alone governed the opening of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Ute 
Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 1089 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 994 (1986). The Tenth Circuit found that this Act, which had no restora- 
tion language, did not diminish the reservation, and that the operative language of 
the Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, did not carry through to the open- 
ing of the reservation. Id. The Utah Supreme Court came to the contrary conclu- 
sion, holding "that as a matter of statutory construction, the 1905 Act was merely 
amendatory and supplementary to the 1902 Act and therefore did not accomplish 
the opening of the Reservation independent of the 1902 Act." Perank, 191 Utah 
Adv. Rep. a t  10. Thus, the language which provided "that unallotted reservation 
lands would be 'restored to the public domain' remained in effect when the Reser- 
vation was finally opened by a presidential proclamation in 1905." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court found support for its view that the 1902 Act was the 
operative statute for opening the Uintah Reservation in "subsequent presidential 
proclamations, congressional acts, executive department orders, and court decisions." 
Id. at  13. These various documents all referred to the 1902 Act as the act which 
authorized the allotment of tribal lands and the sale of surplus lands to non-Indi- 
ans. Although essential to the Perank decision, this issue is beyond the scope of 
this note and will not be examined in detail. 
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viewed the statute for congressional intent to diminish the 
reservation boundaries. The court listed several factors to de- 
termine whether Congress intended t o  diminish the Uintah 
Reservation but found it unnecessary to  look further than the 
first and most probative factor-the language of the statutory 
scheme.44 In concluding that Congress intended to diminish 
the Uintah Reservation, the Perank court relied on several 
United States Supreme Court cases which recognize that res- 
ervation boundaries are diminished by statutory language that 
restores reservation lands t o  the public domain.45 The "opera- 
tive statutory language" of the 1902 Act states that after mem- 
bers of the tribe are allotted their share of reservation lands, 
"unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to 
the public domain."46 The Perank court found this language to 
be persuasive evidence of congressional intent to  diminish the 
Uintah Reservation. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The conflict between the Perank court's decision and the 
decision of the Tenth Circuit may yet be resolved by the United 
States Supreme Court as a petition for certiorari has been filed 
in a companion case.47 The ramifications of the fmal outcome 
are significant, especially for law enforcement in the disputed 
area.48 With the current conflict between state and federal 
case law, law enforcement officials face practical difficulties in 
prosecuting the offenders for crimes which occur in the disput- 
44. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. a t  10. 
45. Id. a t  8-9 (discussing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 
425 (1975); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 US. 351 
(1962)). 
46. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 263 (emphasis added). 
47. State v. Hagen, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (July 17, 1992), petition for cert. 
filed, 1992 WL 166150 (Insta-cite) (U.S. Od. 15, 1992) (No. 92-6281); see also supra 
note 1. 
48. Two additional criminal cases turning on the issue of state jurisdiction in 
the disputed area were decided the same day as  Perank. See State v. Coando, 191 
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (July 17, 1992) (defendant convicted for issuing bad checks in 
Roosevelt, Utah); State v. Hagen, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (July 17, 1992) (defen- 
dant convicted for distributing a controlled substance in Myton, Utah), petition for 
cert. filed, 1992 WL 166150 (Insta-cite) (U.S. Oct. 15, 1992) (No. 92-6281). Four 
mo&hs later the Utah Court of Appeals decided a case based on the Perank deci- 
sion. See Roosevelt City v. Gardner, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Ct. App. Nov. 9, 
1992) (defendant convicted of criminal mischief and unlawful possession and con- 
sumption of alcohol in Roosevelt, Utah). 
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ed area of a reservation. 
For example, if an Indian defendant is convicted under 
state law for a burglary4' committed in the disputed area, he 
could challenge the conviction. Under the federal court's inter- 
pretation of federal law establishing the reservation bound- 
aries, the disputed area is Indian country and the state court 
lacked jurisdiction. If the same Indian defendant committed the 
same criminal act but is convicted under the federal Indian 
Major Crimes he could also challenge the conviction. 
Under the state court's interpretation of federal law establish- 
ing the reservation boundaries, the disputed area is not Indian 
country and the federal court lacked jurisdiction. Thus, law 
enforcement officials need a clear delineation of state and fed- 
eral jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the law in 
this dimcult area. In Solem u. Bartlett,sl the most recent Su- 
preme Court decision to address diminishment of reservation 
boundaries, the Court articulated "a fairly clean analytical 
structure" to differentiate allotment acts that diminished reser- 
vation boundaries from those that merely allowed non-Indian 
settlers to own land within established reservation 
bo~ndaries.~~ This analysis is guided by the principle that on- 
ly Congress can diminish the boundaries of a reservation and 
that all individual parcels of land within a reservation retain 
their reservation status, regardless of ownership, "until Con- 
gress explicitly indicates ~therwise."~ A corollary t o  this prin- 
ciple is that Congress must "clearly evince an 'intent. . . to 
change . . . boundaries' before diminishment will be found."54 
The first factor to be considered in the Solem analysis is 
the statutory language used to open the reservation lands for 
sale to non-Indians. The Court emphasized the significance of 
this factor, referring to it as "[tlhe most probative evidence of 
congressional intent."55 Intent to diminish a reservation is 
manifested when the statute makes "[elxplicit reference to 
cession" or uses 'language evidencing the present and total 
49. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 76-6-202 (1978). 
50. 18 U.S.C. $ 1153(a) (1988). 
51. 465 US.  463 (1984). 
52. Id. at 470. 
53. Id. (citing United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909)). 
54. Id. (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977)). 
55. Id. 
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surrender of all tribal  interest^."^" "almost insurmountable 
presumption" of congressional intent to diminish a reservation 
exists when the statutory language is coupled with "an uncon- 
ditional commitment from Congress to compensate the Indian 
tribe for its opened land."57 
A second factor comes into play when the pertinent statute 
does not contain explicit language of cession. It will be inferred 
that Congress intended to diminish the reservation "[wlhen 
events surrounding the passage of a surplus land act.  . . un- 
equivocally reveal a widely held, contemporaneous understand- 
ing that the affected reservation would shrink as a result of the 
proposed legi~lation."~~ This factor focuses on "the manner in 
which the transaction was negotiated with the tribes involved 
and the tenor of the legislative Reports presented to Con- 
g r e ~ s . " ~ ~  Nonetheless, additional evidence of congressional in- 
tent is demonstrated by its subsequent treatment of the affect- 
ed areas and by the way agencies of the executive branch and 
local judicial authorities dealt with the unallotted open lands. 
The third factor focuses on who actually moved onto the 
opened reservation lands. The Solem Court stated, "[wlhere 
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reser- 
vation and the area has long since lost its Indian character, we 
have acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment 
may have occurred."60 The following sections will analyze 
these three factors as applied to the Uintah Reservation to 
determine whether the Utah Supreme Court decision or the 
Tenth Circuit decision is better reasoned. This note concludes 
that the Utah Supreme Court decision more closely follows 
federal precedent. 
A. Statutory Language 
The most probative evidence of congressional intent is the 
language used in the legislation that opened the surplus lands 
of the Uintah Reservation for non-Indian settlement." The 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 471. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. De facto diminishment will not be used as the sole basis for finding 
diminishment. If neither the act opening the reservation nor its legislative history 
provide "substantial and compelling evidence of congressional intention to diminish 
Indian lands," a court will hold that no diminishment occurred. Id. at 472. 
61. State v. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7 (July 17, 1992) (citing Solem, 465 
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Utah Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit disagree as to the 
significance of the statutory phrase "restored to the public 
domain." In Perank the Utah Supreme Court correctly held 
that this phrase, as used in the 1902 Act, established the nec- 
essary congressional intent t o  diminish the boundaries of the 
Uintah Reser~ation.~~ In Ute Indian Tribe the Tenth Circuit 
interpreted the phrase as it was used in the acts which opened 
the Uncompahgre ReservationG3 and determined that the 
phrase "mean[t] that Indian lands would be available for set- 
tlement, but that the boundaries [would] remain un- 
~hanged.'"~ Relying in part on the fact that the phrase was 
not accompanied by an unconditional commitment to  compen- 
sate the Indians for their lands, the Tenth Circuit concluded 
that the phrase "restored to the public domain" did not indicate 
congressional intent t o  diminish the Uncompahgre Reserva- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
However, case law does not require both cession language 
and a statutory promise t o  compensate the Indians with a sum 
certain for their lands in order to establish that Congress in- 
tended to change reservation boundaries. The Supreme Court 
has stated that when "language of cession is buttressed by an 
unconditional commitment from Congress t o  compensate the 
Indian tribe for its opened land, there is an almost insurmount- 
able presumption that Congress meant for the tribe's reserva- 
tion to be dimini~hed."~~ Although a promise to pay the tribe a 
fixed sum for its lands reinforces cession language as an ex- 
pression of congressional intent, such a promise is not the sine 
qua non. As the Perank court explained, "[nlo specific 
talismanic statutory language is required t o  conclude that Con- 
gress intended t o  diminish a re~ervation."~' 
U.S. a t  470). 
62. Id. at 13. 
63. The Tenth Circuit did not analyze the phrase as it applied to the Uintah 
Reservation because it determined that the Uintah Reservation was opened by the 
1905 Act alone and that the restoration language of the 1902 Act did not carry 
through to the opening of the Uintah Reservation. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 
F.2d 1087, 1089 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. hnied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). 
64. Id. at 1092. 
65. Id. 
66. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1984). 
67. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8 (citing Solem, 465 U.S. at  471). The court 
also explained that the statutory language need not "expressly sever tribal jurisdic- 
tion," "provide for unconditional compensation or a fixed sum to be paid to the 
Indians," or "provide for Indian consent" in order to "effectuate a diminishment." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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For example, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. K n e i ~ , ~ '  the Unit- 
ed States Supreme Court held that the language of the surplus 
land acts opening the Rosebud Indian Reservation expressed 
congressional intent to diminish the reservation boundaries 
even though Congress had rejected a version of the act which 
promised an outright fixed sum as compensation and instead 
adopted a policy to pay the Indians for their lands only as mon- 
ey was received from the settler~.~%milarly, the acts opening 
the Uintah Reservation did not guarantee a fixed sum as com- 
pensation for all of the lands opened to non-Indian settlement. 
Instead the acts provided that the proceeds from the lands 
actually sold t o  homesteaders would be advanced t o  the Indians 
after the United States was reimbursed for expenses incurred 
in effectuating the opening?' 
In Perank, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[sltatutory 
language that opens reservation lands to public entry and 
'restores' those lands to the 'public domain' has . . . been recog- 
nized in a number of Supreme Court cases to effectuate a di- 
minishment of reservation boundaries as to such lands."71 The 
first of these cases, Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington 
State ~enitentiary,~' dealt with the status of the Colville Indi- 
an Reservation. The Supreme Court stated that "[iln 1892, the 
size of this reservation was diminished when Congress passed 
an Act providing that . . . about one-half of the original Colville 
reservation, since commonly referred to as the 'North Half' 
It  is undisputed that "cession-type language" manifests a congressional intent to 
diminish. The Utah Supreme Court quoted, as an example, the key language from 
DeCoteau v. District County Court where the Indians agreed to " 'cede, sell, relin- 
quish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest 
in' " the disputed lands. Id. (quoting DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 
425, 445 (1973). On the other hand, statutory language which merely "opens" 
unallotted reservation lands to settlement by non-Indians is not sufficient to show 
congressional intent to diminish the reservation. Id. (citations omitted). 
68. 430 U.S. 584 (1977). 
69. Id. at 587-88, 592. 
70. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 264. 
71. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8. In addition to the cases discussed in the 
text, the Perank court also cited Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 
317 (1942), which involved lands detached from the Sioux reservation by executive 
order and "restored to the public domain." The Utah Supreme Court inferred that 
"[aln implicit assumption of the opinion is that' the land restored to the public 
domain was no longer subject to tribal jurisdiction and had been detached from the 
Reservation." Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at  8. This case does little to bolster the 
court's argument, however, because only Congress, not the executive branch, can 
disestablish or diminish a reservation. Solem, 465 U.S. at  470. 
72. 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
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should be 'vacated and restored to the public domain.' "73 Con- 
trasting the 1892 Act with the 1906 Act which opened the 
"South Half" of the reservation to non-Indian settlement, the 
Seymour Court found no diminishment by the 1906 Act because 
"[nlowhere in the 1906 Act is there t o  be found any language 
similar to that in the 1892 Act expressly vacating the South 
Half of the reservation and restoring that land to the public 
domain."74 
In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, the Court stated in dicta 
that a portion of the Great Sioux Reservation had been termi- 
nated by an 1889 Act which "restored to the public" approxi- 
mately one-half of the reservation lands.75 Justice Marshall 
agreed with the majority on this point, asserting that the lan- 
guage of the 1889 Act was an example of "'clear language of 
express terminati~n."'~~ The Court followed a similar ap- 
proach in DeCoteau u. District County Court7? where it framed 
the issue of diminishment as whether the reservation was "ter- 
minated and returned t o  the public domain."78 The DeCoteau 
Court concluded that the 1891 Act in dispute-ratifying an 
agreement for relinquishment of "all claim, right, title and 
interest in and to all the unallotted landsn-terminated the 
re~ervat ion .~~ In support of this conclusion, the Court stated 
that the 1891 Act was analogous t o  the Act in Seymour "which 
plainly 'vacated' and restored 'to the public domain' the north- 
ern portion of the Colville Re~ervation."~~ 
73. Id. at 354 (emphasis added). 
74. Id. at 355 (emphasis added). 
75. 430 U.S. 584, 589 & n.5 (1977) (citation omitted). 
76. Id. at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 
504 n. 22 (1973)). 
77. 420 U.S. 425 (1975). 
78. Id. at 426-27. 
79. Id. at 427-28, 439 n.22. 
80. Id. at 449 (quoting Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 
368 U.S. 351, 355 (1962)). However, restoration language is not evidence of intent 
to diminish when the restoration language is not part of the operative language of 
the statute. In Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), the operative language of 
the surplus lands act at  issue did not state that the unallotted lands would be re- 
turned to the public domain. The statute did, however, refer to the opened areas 
as being in the "public domain." Solem, 465 U.S. a t  475. The Supreme Court rec- 
ognized that this reference undisputedly supported the view that the statute dimin- 
ished the reservation but held that because the reference was in an isolated phrase 
it could not be dispositive. Id. at 474-75. The Perank court distinguished Solem on 
the grounds that "[tlhe public domain language in Solem was located in an isolated 
section of the Act, was used only in a descriptive manner, and did not purport to 
restore any land to the public domain." State v. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 8-9 
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In light of these decisions it is somewhat surprising that 
the Tenth Circuit held in Ute Indian Tribe that "the phrase 
'restore t o  the public domain' is not the same as a congressional 
state of mind to dise~tablish."~' The Perank court responded 
to  Ute Indian Tribe by noting that a more recent Tenth Circuit 
decision, Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yaz~ ie ,8~  had 
"revisited the issue of the legal meaning of the phrase 'restore 
to the public domain.' "83 The Yazzie court concluded: 
[Flederal court cases reveal that neither Congress, the courts, 
nor Indian tribes themselves have insisted that restoration 
language be accompanied by more explicit cancellation lan- 
guage. Rather, they have used or accepted simple, operative 
restoration language as  language of reservation termination 
in many situations. We have found no case where operative 
restoration language was not accepted as  language of termi- 
nation.84 
In Yazzie, the Tenth Circuit itself noted that the conclusion in 
Ute Indian Tribe was "unexamined and unsupported in the 
opinion.'"5 
B. Surrounding and Subsequent Events 
Even if the statutory language does not mandate dimin- 
ishment, congressional intent to diminish may be inferred from 
events surrounding the passage of the surplus land act. The 
Perank court argued that the Uintah Reservation was opened 
by the 1902 Act and that the operative language of that act 
was precisely suited to diminishmed6 Since the express lan- 
guage is determinative of congressional intent, the court found 
it unnecessary t o  consider surrounding events in the context of 
evidence of intent to diminish. Nevertheless, a review of sur- 
rounding and subsequent events shows some support of a find- 
ing of dimini~hment.~' 
(July 17, 1992). 
81. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 1092 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) 
(discussing the Uncompahgre Reservation), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). 
82. 909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990). 
83. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. a t  9. 
84. Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1404. 
85. Id. at 1400. 
86. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. a t  10-13. 
87. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit in Ute Indian Tribe argued that the Uintah 
Reservation was opened exclusively by the 1905 Act which contained no restoration 
language and went on to conclude that the events surrounding passage of the a d  
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At first examation, the negotiations with the Ute Tribe do 
provide some evidence of intent to  disestablish. The 1902 Act 
required the consent of the Indians before the reservation could 
be allotted and the surplus lands opened for settlement." The 
Act was amended in 1903 to allow the opening of the reserva- 
tion without the Indians' consent, although their consent was 
to be s~ l ic i ted .~~  Inspector James McLaughlin of the Bureau of 
Indian Maim met with the Indians in the spring of 1903 to 
obtain the consent requested but not required by the 1903 
Act.g0 He explained to the Indians: 'You say that line is very 
heavy and that the reservation is nailed down upon the bor- 
der . . . . [Blut Congress has provided legislation which will 
pull up the nails which hold down that line and after next year 
there will be no outside boundary line to this reservation.'"' 
Inspector McLaughlin clearly spoke in terms of disestablish- 
ment. However, he reported to the Secretary of Interior that 
the Indians were "unanimously opposed to  the opening of their 
reservation under the provisions of the Act.'"' Thus there was 
no agreement for Congress to ratify, and congressional intent 
to diminish the reservation cannot be inferred from the negoti- 
ations with the tribe. 
Subsequent actions and policies toward a particular reser- 
vation, including the way the surplus lands are treated by 
Congress, the executive branch, and local judicial authorities, 
might also be used to infer congressional intent.g3 In 1906 
Congress extended the time for homesteaders to establish a 
residence on opened lands and specifically referred to the 
unallotted lands as "heretofore a part of the Uinta [sic] Indian 
Re~ervation."~~ A 1912 Act also referred to the surplus lands 
as "land which was formerly a part of the Uintah Indian Res- 
did not support a finding that the act disestablished or diminished the reservation. 
Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 108849 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). 
88. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. (388, 32 Stat. 245, 264. 
89. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 982, 997-98. 
90. Id. See supra part 1II.A. 
91. Minutes of Councils Held by James McLaughlin, U.S. Indian Inspector, with 
the Utah and White River Ute Indians at  Uintah Agency, Utah 42 (May 18-23, 
1903), quoted in Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12 (emphasis added). 
92. Letter from James McLaughlin, United States Indian Inspector, to the Sec- 
retary of the Interior (May 30, 1903), reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 33, 58th Cong., 
1st. Sess. 8 (1903). 
93. Cf Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471, 478 (1984) (contradictory treat- 
ment in legislative materials provides no guidance in determining intent). 
94. Act of January 27, 1906, ch. 7, 34 Stat. 9, 9 (emphasis added). 
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ervati~n."'~ Two other acts, one in 1910 and one in 1911, re- 
ferred to 'lands within the ceded Uintah Indian Reserva- 
ti~n."'~ These subsequent acts provide some evidence that 
Congress considered the reservation boundaries diminished by 
sale of the surplus lands. 
In a 1905 Presidential Proclamation, President Theodore 
Roosevelt declared that the unallotted lands in the Uintah 
Reservation "shall be restored to the public dorn~in."'~ A 1906 
Presidential Proclamation referred to "the former Uintah Indi- 
an Reservation in Utah" and declared that a small parcel of the 
tribal grazing reserve was "restored to the public domain."g8 
Action taken by the Secretary of Interior also provides evidence 
of diminishment. In 1934 Congress authorized the Secretary "to 
restore to tribal ownership the remaining surplus lands of any 
Indian reservation heretofore opened."" The Secretary re- 
sponded in 1945 by issuing an order that "added to and made a 
part of the existing reservation" 217,000 acres of opened lands 
which had been within the original Uintah Reservation bound- 
aries.loO Had the reservation merely been opened for settle- 
ment rather than diminished, the status of these lands as part 
of the reservation would not have been affected. By "adding" 
these lands to the reservation the Secretary acknowledged that 
they had once been removed from the reservation. 
Although not dispositive, two examples of treatment of the 
opened areas by local judicial authorities support a finding of 
diminishment. Sowards u. Meagher,lol a case decided shortly 
after the Uintah Reservation was opened, involved a dispute 
over a filing for appropriation of water rights to irrigate reser- 
vation lands which had been opened for settlement. In 
Sowards, the Utah Supreme Court took judicial notice that the 
unallotted lands of the reservation had been "restored to the 
public domain" by the 1902 Act.lo2 In United States v. 
Boss,103 the defendant was prosecuted for introducing liquor 
95. Act of July 20, 1912, ch. 244, 37 Stat. 196, 196 (emphasis added). 
96. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 210, 36 Stat. 1058, 1074; Act of April 4, 1910, 
ch. 140, 36 Stat. 269, 285 (emphasis added). 
97. Proclamation of July 14, 1905, 34 Stat. 3119, 3119 (emphasis added). 
98. Proclamation of September 1, 1906, 34 Stat. 3228, 3228-29 (emphasis add- 
ed). 
99. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 984. 
100. Order Notice, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,409 (1945). 
101. 108 P. 1112 (Utah 1910). 
102. Id. at 1114. 
103. 160 F. 132 (D. Utah 1906). 
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into Indmn country. The United States District Court for the 
District of Utah dismissed the charges for lack of jurisdiction 
because the alleged offense occurred on unallotted lands after 
the opening of the reservation and was therefore not in Indian 
country as required by the statute.lo4 
The contemporaneous and subsequent treatment of the 
unallotted opened lands by Congress, the executive branch and 
local judicial authorities, while not dispositive, support a de- 
termination that the clear statutory language shows congres- 
sional purpose t o  diminish. 
C. De Facto Diminishment 
On a pragmatic level, the Court has recognized that "who 
actually moved onto opened reservation lands is also relevant 
t o  deciding whether a surplus land Act diminished a reserva- 
tion."'" This is true, in part, because when an area is pre- 
dominantly used or  populated by non-Indians, "finding that the 
land remains Indian country seriously burdens the administra- 
tion of state and local government."'" The recognition of the 
actual state of things in determining whether a state may exer- 
cise jurisdiction over Indian territory has been consistently 
recognized. As early as 1832, Justice McClean in a concurring 
opinion asserted that "[ilf a tribe of Indians shall become so 
degraded or reduced in numbers, as to lose the power of self 
government, the protection of the local law, of necessity, must 
be extended over them."lO' This same concept was reiterated 
in Solem when the Court declared that diminishment may have 
occurred when an "area has long since lost its Indian charac- 
ter."lo8 
At the time Congress enacted the allotment policy and the 
surplus land legislation, the common assumption was that 
Indian reservations were a thing of the past. Indeed, the Su- 
preme Court has acknowledged that, "[~Jonsistent with prevail- 
ing wisdom, Members of Congress voting on the surplus land 
104. Id. at 134. 
105. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984). 
106. Id. at 471 n.12. 
107. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 593 (1832) (McClean, J., concur- 
ring). Worcester is one of Chief Justice Marshall's trilogy of cases dealing with the 
roots of federal Indian Law. The other cases in the trilogy are Johnson v. 
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 
(5 Pet.) 1 (183 1). ,See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-33. 
108. Solern, 465 U.S. at 471. 
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Acts believed to a man that within a short timewithin a 
generation at most-the Indian tribes would enter traditional 
American society and the reservation system would cease to 
exi~t."''~ Thus, it would be reasonable to conclude that Con- 
gress intended diminishment and disestablishment by the 
Dawes Act1'' and each accompanying surplus land act. 
However, this conclusion does not end the inquiry because 
of the federal government's trustee relationship with the Indi- 
ans. This relationship leads to "the general rule that '[dloubtful 
expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defense- 
less people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its 
protection and good faith.' ""' As a result, a general intent to 
terminate or diminish cannot be implied and every surplus 
land act must be individually examined to ascertain congressio- 
nal intent. 
The clash between the goals of the allotment policy and 
Congress's trustee responsibilities has created an enigma. Con- 
gress did not define reservation boundaries in the various sur- 
plus land acts because it believed that the reservations would 
cease to exist; yet each act must be examined to determine 
whether Congress intended the boundaries to change. Because 
of the difficulties inherent in divining congressional intent in 
this situation, de facto diminishment is a significant pragmatic 
indicator of whether the boundaries of the reservation have 
been duninished. Although "[rlesort to subsequent demographic 
history is . . . an unorthodox . . . method of statutory interpre- 
tation, . . . in the area of surplus land Acts, where various 
factors kept Congress from focusing on the dminishment issue, 
. . . the technique is a necessary expedient."ll2 
For example, in support of its finding that the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Reservation had not been diminished, the Solem 
Court noted that the opened area had not lost its Indian char- 
acter.ll3 Very few homesteaders settled in the opened areas 
and a strong tribal presence remained. At the time of the litiga- 
tion, two-thirds of the enrolled members of the tribe lived in 
the opened area and the seat of tribal government-where most 
109. Id. at 468. 
110. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
111. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (quot- 
ing Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)). 
112. Solem, 465 U.S. at 472 n.13. 
113. Id. at 480. 
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important tribal activities take place-was in the opened ar- 
ea. 'I4 
This situation can be contrasted with the Rosebud Sioux 
Reservation. In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,ll5 the Court 
held that the boundaries of the reservation had been dimin- 
ished and recognized that the State of South Dakota had con- 
sistently exercised jurisdiction over the disputed area which 
was "over 90% non-Indian, both in population and in land 
Use.ffl 16 Thus, the area had lost its Indian character. Similar- 
ly, in DeCoteau u. District County Court,"' the Court held 
that the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation had been terminat- 
ed? The population of the former reservation consisted of 
3,000 tribal members and 30,000 non-Indians.llg Only fifteen 
percent of the original reservation land was owned in various 
"Indian trust allotments" scattered randomly throughout non- 
Indian owned land.lzO 
Although the United States Supreme Court has found this 
to be an important factor, the possibility of de facto diminish- 
ment of the Uintah Reservation was not even addressed by the 
Tenth Circuit and was relegated to a footnote in the Perank 
decision.l2l The disputed area of the Uintah-Ouray Reserva- 
tion has lost its Indian character. Approximately 18,000 non- 
Indians currently live in the area that the Perank court decided 
had been disestablished.12' Only 300 Indians, not all of whom 
are members of the Ute tribe, live in this same area? The 
Ute Tribe has about 1,500 enrolled members, nearly all of 
whom live on trust lands and not in the disputed area? The 
tribal seat of government is located on trust lands at Fort 
Duchesne.lz5 The fact that the opened portion of the Uintah 
Reservation has lost its Indian character is an important ele- 
ment weighing in favor of a finding of diminishment. 
114. Id. 
115. 430 U.S. 584 (1977). 
116. Id. at 605. 
117. 420 U.S. 425 (1975). 
118. Id. at 449. 
119. Id. at 428. 
120. Id. 
121. State v. Perank, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 19 n.10 (July 17, 1992). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id.; Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 1105 (10th Cir. 1985) (Seth, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). 
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The controversy over the exercise of state jurisdiction in 
parts of the original Uintah Reservation was rekindled by the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Perank. If the United States 
Supreme Court decides to hear State v. Hagen,'% it is likely 
to conclude that the reservation has been diminished. First, the 
express language of the statute allotting lands to tribal mem- 
bers and opening surplus lands for settlement demonstrates 
that Congress intended to diminish the reservation. The opera- 
tive statutory phrase, "restore to the public domain," is clear 
evidence that Congress intended to terminate the reservation 
status of the lands which were thereby restored. Second, a 
finding of diminishment is supported by contemporaneous and 
subsequent treatment of the area by Congress, the executive 
branch and judicial authorities, although these actions are too 
ambiguous to be decisive. Third, the disputed lands have lost 
their Indian character. De facto diminishment is a powerful, 
practical reason that the state, rather than the tribe or the 
federal government, should have jurisdiction over the disputed 
area. 
David R. Williams 
126. 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (July 16, 1992), petition for cert. filed, 1992 WL 
166150 (Instacite) (U.S. Od. 15, 1992) WO. 92-6281). 
